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Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Most
Favored Nation Contract Clauses in
Managed Care and Health Insurance
Contracts
Anthony J. Dennis*
INTRODUCTION
Most favored nation (MFN) contract clauses have been
widely used in the health care industry by managed care organi-
zations' and health insurers2 in contracts with medical provid-
ers.3 An MFN contract clause consists of a promise by a seller
of products or services, in the health care context a medical pro-
vider, to a purchaser of those products or services, an insurer,
* Anthony J. Dennis is Counsel at Aetna Life and Casualty Company in Hart-
ford, Connecticut. He co-authored THE HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST MANUAL and au-
thored several law review and other legal articles on a variety of topics, including
antitrust, health care, and corporate law. Mr. Dennis holds a Doctor of Jurisprudence
degree from Northwestern University School of Law and a Bachelor of Arts degree,
cum laude, from Tufts University.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of Aetna Life and Casualty Company or any other party.
The author would like to thank all those who reviewed and commented on this
article.
1. "Managed care plans offer pre-paid health insurance in which customers pay an
up-front fee or premium in return for nearly unlimited access to a network of medical
providers at little or no additional cost. Such plans include ... HMOs,... PPOs and
several variations on these two basic managed care entities." Anthony J. Dennis,
Hospitals, Physicians, and Health Insurers: Guarding Against Implied Agreements in
the Health Care Context, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 115, 117 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
2. In contrast to managed care, indemnity insurance does not involve care ren-
dered by a limited network of medical providers for a prepaid fee. Instead, the health
insurer generally pays a set percent (typically 80%) of all billed charges while the
insured pays the remaining amount. Id. at 116. For a general discussion of the differ-
ent forms of health care financing and delivery and the success of each form in hold-
ing down medical costs and influencing physician behavior, see id. at 116-19.
3. See generally Arnold Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Na-
tions Clauses in Contracts Between Health Care Providers and Insurers, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 863 (1991) (analyzing MFN provisions from the perspective of the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act). Professor Celnicker stated that it is "not uncom-
mon" for Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans to use MEN provisions. Id. at 869-70 n.44.
Celnicker's belief parallels the author's own. At least two large managed dental
plans, Delta Dental Plan of Arizona, Inc. and Oregon Dental Service Corporation,
and the nation's largest vision care insurer, Vision Service Plan, have also used MEN
clauses in contracts with dentists and optometrists, respectively. See infra note 7.
1
Dennis: Potential Antocompetitive Effects of Most Favored Nation Contract
Published by LAW eCommons, 1995
Annals of Health Law
pursuant to which the seller agrees to give the purchaser as
favorable a price as that seller is giving to any other purchaser. 4
MFN contract clauses can be characterized as just another
form of volume discount sale. Typically, only health insurers
with substantial market strength representing a sizable book of
business are able to induce providers to sign contracts contain-
ing MEFN clauses.5 Indeed, one federal district court even went
so far as to use the presence or absence of MIFN clauses as part
of a test for determining whether an insurer had substantial
market power.6 If a given insurer does not have a substantial
customer base representing a large -volume of potential patients
for medical providers, then providers have little or no reason to
give that insurer their lowest available rates for rendering medi-
cal care. In the language of the health care industry, the larger
the amount of patient "steerage" that insurers can deliver to
providers, the more willing providers are to offer some form of
volume discount. As a form of favorably low pricing typically
granted to large buyers, MFN contract clauses are a form of vol-
ume discount.
MFN contract clauses are not "best price" clauses, since offer-
ing the best price means offering a price unique and lower than
the price offered to any other third-party payer. Under an MFN
contract clause, providers only promise to offer the lowest price
offered to anyone else so that at least two purchasers will reap
the lowest rate.
MFN contract clauses have been repeatedly challenged during
the last 15 years under both federal and state antitrust laws.7 To
4. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1103-04 (1st Cir. 1989) (pursuant to Blue Cross's MEN clause, it
would not pay "a physician more for any service or procedure than that physician was
accepting from any other health care cost provider"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027
(1990); see also JoHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST LAW § 15.04[2] (1992).
5. In each of the proceedings challenging MFN clauses to date, the parties that
extracted this kind of price protection provision had overwhelming market power as
evidenced by market share. See cases cited infra note 7 and see section II below.
6. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1418
(D. Kan. 1987), aff'd, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990). The
district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also looked at several other
factors to assess the extent of Blue Cross's market power. It should be noted that
Reazin did not directly confront the question of the legality of MFN clauses under the
antitrust laws.
7. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989) (challenging MFN clauses as illegal monopoliza-
tion under section 2 of the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); Kitsap
Physician Serv. v. Washington Dental Serv., 671 F. Supp. 1267 (W.D. Wash. 1987)
(challenging MEN clauses as unlawful attempted monopolization under section 2 of
[Vol. 4
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date, these challenges have not succeeded,8 and the MFN
clauses have been upheld every time. However, despite the
well-developed case law on the subject, the legal status of MFN
clauses is clearly still evolving.9
The Department of Justice under the Clinton Administration
has taken a more skeptical view of and aggressive stance toward
MFN clauses than have previous administrations. Assistant At-
torney General Anne K. Bingaman, head of the Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division, has been particularly vocal in this
the Sherman Act); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. v. Michigan Ass'n of Psycho-
therapy Clinics, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); In Re Ethyl
Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v.
F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (challenging defendant's use of MFN clauses as an
unfair method of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act);
Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 325
N.W.2d 471 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (challenging MFN clauses as unlawful price fixing
under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and Michigan's state antitrust laws); Willam-
ette Dental Group, P.C. v. Oregon Dental Serv. Corp., 882 P.2d 637 (Or. Ct. App.
1994) (challenging MIFN clauses as unlawful monopolization and attempted monopo-
lization under Oregon state antitrust laws).
The Department of Justice and the Arizona Attorney General's Office filed a pro-
posed settlement agreement in the federal district court in Phoenix, Arizona, on Au-
gust 30, 1994, to settle antitrust charges against Delta Dental Plan of Arizona arising
out of its use of MFN clauses in contracts with dentists. Under the settlement decree,
which must still be formally accepted by the court, Delta Dental will make no admis-
sion of liability or wrongdoing but must renounce using MFN clauses in its contracts.
See Press Release, Dep't of Justice.(Aug. 30, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Aug. 30, 1994 Press Release]; Arizona Dental Plan Settles Federal, State Conspiracy
Charges, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1679, at 277 (Sept. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter Sept. 1, 1994 BNA]. The federal government had alleged that Delta Den-
tal's MFN clauses constituted an unreasonable vertical restraint. Id. In contrast, the
State of Arizona had been pursuing the theory that the MFN clauses in question con-
stituted illegal price fixing and boycott activity. See Arizona v. Delta Dental Plan of
Ariz., Inc., No. CV 94-10142 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa County, July 1, 1994). The
Department of Justice filed suit as well as a proposed settlement agreement on De-
cember 15, 1994, in the District Court of the District of Columbia against Vision Ser-
vice Plan, the nation's largest vision care insurer. The suit alleged that Vision Service
Plan's use of MFN clauses in contracts with optometrists violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice (Dec. 15, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Dec. 15, 1994 Press Release].
8. The proposed settlement agreement, which would settle antitrust charges
against Delta Dental Plan of Arizona by both the Department of Justice and the State
of Arizona, does not involve any admission or finding of liability. The same holds
true for the proposed settlement agreement involving Vision Service Plan. While
these settlement decrees have no precedential value, they do underscore the federal
government's enhanced enforcement activity in this area.
9. "The new antitrust [enforcement] environment is inherently more uncertain...
than that of even 2 years ago." Joseph J. Kattan, Beyond Facilitating Practices: Price
Signalling and Price Protection Clauses in the New Antitrust Enforcement Environ-
ment, 63 ANTITRUsT L.J. 133, 150 (1994).
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respect, indicating in a recent speech that the Antitrust Division
is conducting several ongoing investigations into MFN clauses. 10
Assistant Attorney General Bingaman also spoke out against
an MFN clause in a 1993 letter to Cynthia M. Maleski, Commis-
sioner of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department.1' In the au-
tumn of 1993, the Pennsylvania agency had before it a request
from a state Blue Cross organization to use an MFN provision in
its contracts with hospitals.12 Assistant Attorney General Bin-
gaman's letter expressed her concern that MFN clauses were be-
ing used by dominant insurers like Blue Cross of Western
Pennsylvania with the intent or effect of smothering the compe-
tition, creating an artificial price floor in the health care and
health insurance markets, and preventing or deterring the entry
of competitors. 3
The Antitrust Division has also investigated and brought
charges against health care entities that use MFN clauses. On
August 30, 1994, the United States Department of Justice simul-
taneously filed a lawsuit and a proposed settlement decree in
the District Court of Arizona. The decree settled antitrust
charges against a state dental plan, Delta Dental Plan of Ari-
zona, Inc., which arose from Delta Dental's use of MFN clauses
in contracts with dentists. 4 Similarly, on December 15 of that
year, the Department of Justice sued Vision Service Plan and
simultaneously filed a proposed settlement decree. The case
10. Assistant Attorney General Bingaman made remarks to this effect in a speech
she delivered to the Group Health Association of America on February 15, 1994. See
66 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1651, at 191 (Feb. 17, 1994).
11. See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice to Cynthia M. Maleski, Commissioner,
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with author).
12. The state insurance department ultimately denied Blue Cross of Western
Pennsylvania's request to use an MEFN clause in its hospital contracts. See Letter from
Cynthia M. Maleski, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Insurance to Mr.
Eugene J. Barone, President and CEO, Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania (Oct. 29,
1993) (on file with author). The insurance department does not have antitrust juris-
diction; it founded its decision on public policy grounds, not explicitly antitrust
grounds. The outcome of this agency proceeding does not mean that MFN clauses are
illegal under Pennsylvania's antitrust laws. Nonetheless, some of the public policy
reasons articulated as the basis of the insurance department's decision appeared to
indicate some level of discomfort with the potential anticompetitive effects of MFN
clauses.
13. See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman to Cynthia M. Maleski, supra note 11.
14. See Aug. 30, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7; Sept. 1, 1994 BNA, supra note
[Vol. 4
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arose from the vision care insurer's use of MFN clauses in its
contracts with optometrists. 15
For the first time, a state agency prohibited the use of MFN
clauses in the health care context expressly on antitrust grounds.
The Washington Health Services Commission issued a perma-
nent rule-making order on January 26, 1995, to become effective
on October 1, 1995, banning the use of MFN clauses "in con-
tracts between a health care provider or facility and a certified
health plan."'1 6 The state health commission adopted this rule in
the belief that MFN provisions have "the potential to thwart...
cost containment goals.' 17
These recent developments indicate that the legal status of
MFN contract clauses under the antitrust laws is far from set-
tled. It appears the Clinton Justice Department is determined to
make new law in this area by challenging MFN clauses wherever
and whenever it can find them in the health care marketplace.
This article will consider the anticompetitive effects of MFN
contract clauses as well as the arguments in favor of these provi-
sions. Although there are procompetitive justifications for using
such clauses, MFN provisions appear to have a tendency to both
force competitors from the health care market and set an artifi-
cial price floor in the health care marketplace. In light of the
evolving case law and increasingly active enforcement environ-
ment, this article will also set forth several observations and rec-
ommendations for practitioners contemplating the use of
contract MFN clauses.
I. COMPETITIVE IMPACr OF MFN CONTRACT CLAUSES
The primary reason that MFN contract clauses have with-
stood antitrust scrutiny may possibly stem from the fundamental
right of buyers to bargain with whomever they choose at
whatever price they choose. A buyer's right to bargain has been
enshrined in the antitrust laws by the Colgate doctrine, derived
from a 1919 United States Supreme Court decision of the same
name.'8 The doctrine has reverberated in several antitrust cases
that arose over the years that challenged contracts between
15. See Dec. 15, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7.
16. See Rule-Making Order, Wash. Health Servs. Comm'n (Jan. 26, 1995) (on file
with author). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 245-02-010, -045 (1995).
17. Rule-Making Order, supra note 16.
18. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (stating the buyer has the
right under the antitrust laws to "exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal").
1995]
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health insurers and providers. 19 Most recently, this venerable
principle found expression in the First Circuit Court of Appeals'
1989 decision in Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island.20 Despite overwhelming
evidence of anticompetitive conduct by the defendant Blue
Cross and the anticompetitive effect that Blue Cross's MIFN
clause had on competitors like Ocean State, the court found in
favor of Blue Cross when it concluded that the MFN clause at
issue did not constitute illegal monopolization in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.21
The court was able to overcome and essentially brush aside
abundant evidence of anticompetitive impact and intent by
founding its decision on the right of buyers to bargain for the
lowest obtainable price. The First Circuit stated:
We agree with the district court that such a policy of insisting
on a supplier's lowest price-assuming that the price is not
"predatory" or below the supplier's incremental cost-tends
to further competition on the merits and, as a matter of law, is
not exclusionary. It is hard to disagree with the district court's
view: ["]As a naked proposition, it would seem silly to argue
that a policy to pay the same amount for the same service is
anticompetitive, even on the part of one who has market
power. This, it would seem, is what competition should be all
about. ["1]22
Thus, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, like the federal dis-
trict court before it, actually characterized Ocean State's anti-
trust complaint as "silly." 23
19. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Penn., 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.)
(holding Blue Cross's contracts with hospitals prohibiting them from shifting certain
overhead costs to Blue Cross to the disadvantage of other insurers like Travelers did
not violate sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
Finding in favor of Blue Cross, the Third Circuit stated:
In its negotiating with hospitals, Blue Cross has done no more than conduct
its business as every rational enterprise does, i.e., get the best deal possi-
ble.... To be sure, Blue Cross'[s] initiative makes life harder for commercial
competitors such as Travelers. The antitrust laws, however, protect competi-
tion, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned.
Id. at 84; Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding Blue
Shield contracts requiring physicians to accept Blue Cross reimbursement as payment
in full for services rendered and prohibiting those providers from billing patients, i.e.,
a ban on "balance billing," do not violate sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
20. 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
21. Id. at 1110-13.
22. Id. at 1110 (quoting Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52, 71 (D.R.I. 1988)).
23. Id.
[Vol. 4
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The First Circuit, affirming the Rhode Island District Court,
like other courts that have heard antitrust cases challenging
MFN clauses and other types of contractual provisions, essen-
tially dismissed such challenges because of the well-established
right of a buyer to bargain with or "get the best deal possible '24
from sellers. Although the courts have not expressly dwelled on
the point, there appears to be an unstated rationale for uphold-
ing the buyer's right to bargain: if health insurers are able to
obtain favorable prices from providers, then these lower prices
will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower health in-
surance premiums.
MEN clauses represent more than just the fruit of hard bar-
gaining between buyers and sellers. In extracting an MEN guar-
antee from a seller, a dominant buyer has done more than
bargain for the lowest obtainable price: it has in fact linked its
price with the most favorable price any other buyer receives
over the life of the contract. Thus, the idea that an MFN con-
tract clause falls neatly under the rubric of the Colgate doc-
trine-an agreement between a buyer and seller who engaged in
hard bargaining-is not entirely accurate. MFN contract
clauses take as their frame of reference the price deals obtained
by third parties. By implicating the commercial relationships of
other buyers, MIFN clauses can indirectly affect the price struc-
ture of the entire marketplace as well as everyone in it.
A. Forcing Competitors From the Market
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Ocean State was not
able to step back from the Colgate doctrine; it turned a blind eye
to the anticompetitive effect of Blue Cross's MFN clause on the
competition.2 5 A look at the actual market effects of MFN con-
tract clauses clearly reveals the power of these provisions to af-
fect the behavior of providers and the economic fortunes of
competitors. Health insurers that have persuaded providers to
accept an MFN clause in their contracts typically possess signifi-
cant market power, with market shares ranging in some cases
24. See Travelers, 481 F.2d at 84; see also Kartell, 749 F.2d 922.
25. 883 F.2d 1101.
1995]
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from 75 % to 85 %.26 These health plans may sometimes concede
that they possess monopoly power.27
Some smaller insurers who compete with these dominant in-
surers have been forced out of business because the provider,
when faced with a choice to do business solely with the domi-
nant insurer or to do business with both the dominant insurer
and other, smaller companies that can deliver less patient vol-
ume but can absorb the provider's excess capacity (thereby acti-
vating the MFN provision), choose to terminate or avoid
relations with the other insurers to avoid activating the MFN
provision. The large book of business that providers enjoy cour-
tesy of the dominant insurer is economically more valuable than
realizing an increase in patient volume originating from a com-
peting plan. The latter has the effect of activating the MFN
clause, which forces the providers to lower their prices across
the board. As a result, competitors of the dominant health plan
may eventually be forced out of the market because they are
unable to develop and retain a viable provider network to ser-
vice their customers. The facts of actual cases demonstrate this
phenomenon in action.
The Ocean State case involved a small, provider-owned HMO,
Ocean State, that entered the health care financing market in
Rhode Island in competition with the state's largest insurer,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island. Ocean State's en-
trance into the market appeared to benefit Rhode Island con-
sumers as it "provided more coverage and charged lower
premiums" than Blue Cross.28 As a result, the Ocean State
HMO initially enjoyed great commercial success. The federal
appellate court noted that "[b]y the spring of 1986, Blue Cross
had lost approximately 30,000 of its 453,015 enrollees, while
Ocean State's enrollment had exceeded all expectations, grow-
ing to 70,000. ' ' 29 Blue Cross implemented a three-part strategy,
which included the insertion of MFN clauses in each of its pro-
26. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania had a market share of approximately
75% as of the fall of 1993. See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman to Cynthia M.
Maleski, supra note 11. As of August 30, 1994, Delta Dental Plan of Arizona had
contracts with 85% of all dentists in Arizona and was acknowledged as the largest
dental insurer in the state. See Aug. 30, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7. Precise
figures on Delta Dental's actual market share were not available.
27. For example, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island conceded the point,
so the parties never argued it in Ocean State. 883 F.2d at 1110.
28. Id. at 1103.
29. Id.
[Vol. 4
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vider contracts.3" The impact of Blue Cross's MFN clause was
immediate. To avoid having to lower their fees to Blue Cross in
accordance with the MFN clause, "approximately 350 of Ocean
State's 1200 physicians resigned."' 31 Ocean State no longer had a
viable, provider network with which to attract and retain
clients .32
Similarly, in the Arizona dental insurance market, the United
States Department of Justice found that the dominant dental in-
surer's use of an MFN clause in its contracts with area dentists
essentially forced those dentists to avoid dealing with competing
dental plans.33 With the MIFN clause in place, dentists in that
state found that it no longer made any economic sense to deal
with any insurers other than Delta Dental. According to the
federal complaint filed by the United States Department of Jus-
tice in the District Court of Arizona, literally "hundreds" of
state dentists terminated their relationships with Delta Dental's
competitors after the imposition of the MFN clause, rather than
risk activating their MFN obligation under their contracts with
Delta Dental.34
This mass exodus by hundreds of providers demonstrates the
awesome power that MFN clauses can have in affecting provider
behavior and undermining competitors in the health insurance
market. When the dust settled in both Rhode Island and Ari-
zona after the dominant insurer in each state instituted an MFN
contract obligation, competing health and dental plans were left
bleeding and wounded on the floor. It is clear that MFN con-
tract clauses, coupled with significant market power, can serve
as a powerfully effective tool to undermine or even destroy ex-
isting competitors as well as prevent new market entrants from
gaining a foothold in the health insurance market.
30. Id. at 1103-04. The other parts of the strategy involved the introduction of its
own HMO known as HealthMate and the use of an "adverse selection" pricing policy,
which lowered prices for those commercial customers that solely offered Blue Cross
products to their employees rather than competitors' health insurance products.
31. Id. at 1104.
32. Ocean State sued, alleging unlawful monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Despite substantial evidence that Blue Cross's conduct was "willful"
and "exclusionary" within the meaning of United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563,
570-71 (1966) and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605 n.32 (1985), the First Circuit found in favor of the defendant Blue Cross. 883 F.2d
at 1110-13.
33. See Aug. 30, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7; Sept. 1, 1994 BNA, supra note
7.
34. See Aug. 30, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7; Sept. 1, 1994 BNA, supra note
1995]
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B. Setting a Price Floor
MFN contract clauses also have the potential to set a price
floor in the health care market. When providers do not want to
contract with additional health plans for a lower price for fear of
activating an MFN clause, then the MFN contract rate in' effect
becomes the standard price for the entire market. MFN con-
tract clauses can operate to set a price floor in the health care
market in two respects.
First, since they are found in service contracts between vari-
ous types of medical providers and health insurers, MEFN con-
tract rates can set the minimum price for all medical services
covered by the contract. Thus, the cost of such services incurred
by a dominant insurer with an MIFN clause can become the price
for all other competitors in the market that deal with those same
providers. No one is able to obtain a better price for medical
services than the dominant insurer-the MFN clause thus estab-
lishes a price floor in the health care delivery market.
Second, MFN contract clauses can establish a price floor with
respect to the overall cost of all health insurance products of-
fered in that market. A health plan's overall expenses deter-
mine in large part the price it will charge for all of its health
insurance products. The cost of delivering medical care consti-
tutes most of a health plan's costs in offering health insurance
products. If an MFN clause sets a price floor for a particular
type of medical service, then it also indirectly operates to estab-
lish a price floor with respect to the ultimate price of all prod-
ucts. For example, the largest single expense item for any health
plan is typically hospital costs. Thus, the kind of pricing that a
health insurer is able to obtain from hospitals in large part
drives the price of the overall health insurance product. If hos-
pital pricing in the market has become rigid due to the existence
of an MFN clause, then the price structure in the health insur-
ance market will also become similarly fixed at an artificial price
floor. Thus, competing insurers will be unable to offer, and thus
consumers will be unable to buy, insurance below a set price
because of the artificial price floor in the health insurance
marketplace.
The District Court of Kansas recognized this pernicious effect
of MFN contract clauses in the Reazin case. The Tenth Circuit
stated:
[S]ince the price of hospital care is the single largest element
of health care financing companies' costs, the "most favored
[Vol. 4
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nations" clause effectively prevents competing insurance com-
panies from offering more favorable insurance rates to con-
sumers. This clause gives defendant the ability to prevent
insurance prices from falling, thus providing it the ability to
effectively control insurance prices.
The current Department of Justice apparently perceives simi-
lar anticompetitive effects. In Assistant Attorney General Bin-
gaman's September 7, 1993, letter to Pennsylvania Insurance
Commissioner Cynthia Maleski, she expressed concern about
the anticompetitive effects of Blue Cross of Western Penn-
sylvania's MFN clause in its hospital contracts:
Based on our review, we conclude that implementation of the
[MFN clause] likely would result in higher hospital prices to
[Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania's] competitors. The cost
to hospitals of making price concessions to competitors would
increase because the same price concessions would have to be
granted to [Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania]. It is unlikely
that any savings to [Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania] from
the [MFN provision] would benefit western Pennsylvania
health plan purchasers. The increase in competitors' costs
likely would cause their health plan prices to rise, which would
enable [Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania] to increase its
health plan prices. Finally, there are other means available to
accomplish such cost savings, used by Blue Cross plans else-
where in the country, that would not impede competition.36
Thus, both the Department of Justice and the District Court
of Kansas perceive MFN contract clauses as creating an artificial
price floor in the health care marketplace. The facts in the
above-described cases and agency proceedings themselves speak
eloquently of this pernicious effect.
C. Procompetitive Justifications
Defendants that have had their MFN clauses challenged in
court have used a variety of arguments to defend the clauses,
depending on the nature of the antitrust violation alleged. The
primary rationale for using such provisions is that MFN clauses
enable health insurers to lower the price of their own products.
By reducing the purchase cost of medical care on behalf of its
members, health insurers are able to reduce their own operating
expenses. Presumably, this expense reduction is reflected in
35. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1418 (D. Kan.
1987), aff'd, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
36. See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman to Cynthia M. Maleski, supra note 11.
1995]
11
Dennis: Potential Antocompetitive Effects of Most Favored Nation Contract
Published by LAW eCommons, 1995
Annals of Health Law
lower product prices. However, as the Department of Justice
recently noted, this is not always the case. In her letter to the
Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, Assistant Attorney
General Bingaman stated in part that it would be unlikely that
health plan purchasers in Western Pennsylvania would benefit
from any savings to Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania that
resulted from its MEN clause. Rather, MFN clauses can help
dominant insurers establish a price floor.37 As the Department
of Justice recognized, there is no guarantee that an insurer using
an MFN clause will pass on to consumers the cost savings it
reaps.38
II. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No court to date has concluded that MIFN contract clauses are
illegal. The Pennsylvania Insurance Department proceeding
disallowed use of an MFN contract clause for public policy rea-
sons, not specifically for antitrust reasons. Furthermore, the
Department of Justice's proposed consent settlements involving
Delta Dental Plan of Arizona, Inc. and Vision Service Plan do
not include any admission or finding of liability or wrongdoing.
The federal district courts in those cases were not given an op-
portunity to judge the MFN contract clause at issue under the
antitrust laws.39 Thus, the Delta Dental and Vision Service Plan
settlement decrees do not stand for the proposition that MFN
clauses are illegal under the federal antitrust laws. Instead,
those investigations and subsequent proposed settlements
merely indicate that the federal government is aggressively pur-
suing such cases.
Given the increased scrutiny of these provisions over the last
two years, federal antitrust enforcement authorities, and at least
some states, will most likely continue to closely scrutinize, and
challenge where appropriate, health insurers' use of MFN con-
tract clauses. Given the foregoing observations about the quick-
ening pace of recent enforcement activity in this area, health
37. Id.
38. In the absence of internal cost data from various health insurers, this is a hard
point for anyone, including the Department of Justice, to prove or disprove. The
result depends on whether the individual insurer passes on its cost savings in the form
of lower prices, which would make the health plan more price competitive in the
market, or retains the savings, adds the savings to reserves, or passes the savings on to
stockholders in the form of higher stock dividends.
39. Aug. 30, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7; Sept. 1, 1994 BNA, supra note 7;
Dec. 15, 1994 Press Release, supra note 7.
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care providers must be aware of whether and under what cir-
cumstances MFN contract clauses can safely be used in their
contracts.
A. Market Strength
A client's risk of investigation and possible suit for using
MFN clauses is a function of that client's market strength. All
of the cases, agency proceedings, and investigations mentioned
or discussed in this article make it clear that health insurers with
substantial market strength are particularly vulnerable to inves-
tigation and suit.40 As previously stated, only health insurers
with a commanding position in the market typically utilize MFN
clauses. However, it is conceivable that insurers with sizable but
not dominant or commanding market shares might be capable
of negotiating MIFN arrangements with local providers. Thus,
the risks of investigation and suit must be weighed against the
potential benefits of using such provisions in contracts with
providers.
B. Volume Discounts and "Notice"-Type MFN Clauses
Another way to reduce the legal risks associated with MFN
contract clauses is to use a variation of the MFN concept that
serves the client's business interest in obtaining a favorable price
but does not raise as much antitrust concern. One obvious alter-
native is a simple volume discount deal based on the number of
patients that the health insurer can send to the provider. The
larger the volume, the lower the price per head or capitation
rate.4 '
Another option is to institute a "notice"-type MIEFN clause
much like the one at issue in National Benefit Administrators v.
Blue Cross.42 In that case, a third-party administrator of em-
40. See also Anthony J. Dennis, Proposed Arizona Settlement Sheds More Light
on Most Favored Nation Clauses, 1 HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST MANUAL, Nov. 1994,
at 5, 6; Kattan, supra note 9, at 150-51:
Large buyers who negotiate price protection clauses must now be concerned
with the prospect of a government investigation, notwithstanding the First
Circuit's clear endorsement of contracting "to get the lowest possible price."
... Buyers with dominant market shares now face a threat of antitrust en-
forcement when they engage in the sensible practice of securing the best
prices for their inputs.
41. See generally NAT'L HEALTH LAWYERS Ass'N, THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
MANAGED CARE (Susan K. Chambers ed., 1990).
42. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,831, at 62,370 (M.D. Ala. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d
1143 (11th Cir. 1990).
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ployee benefit programs, National Benefit Administrators and
Goff Agency, sued Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for, among other
practices, Blue Cross's use of a "notice"-type MFN clause in its
contracts with hospitals. 3 The clause was not a standard MFN
clause, but merely required a given hospital to give Blue Cross
"notice" and an opportunity to renegotiate if the hospital gave
equal or better rates to a third party." The clause stated:
If at any time Hospital contracts or agrees with any other third
party health benefit plan payor... to provide health care serv-
ices ... at payment amounts which are equal to or less than
those applicable to [Blue Cross] Members under this Contract,
Hospital shall immediately give written notice of the fact of
such contract ... to [Blue Cross]. Such notice shall be for the
sole purposes of affording [Blue Cross] opportunity to evaluate
the advantages and consideration expected to inure to Hospital
from such other payor and to renegotiate the terms of this Con-
tract. No provision of this Contract shall be construed or ap-
plied as limiting in any way either Hospital's or [Blue Cross's]
right to engage freely in agreements with other competing
[payors or providers] .5
The federal district court concluded that this provision dif-
fered from the MFN clause at issue in Ocean State46 and did not
raise similar antitrust concerns. The court rejected the plain-
tiff's antitrust allegations and found in favor of the defendant.4 7
As indicated by the decision in National Benefit Administra-
tors, a "notice"-type MIFN contract clause apparently passes
muster under the federal antitrust laws. Although one can
never rule out an investigation or frivolous lawsuit, it appears
that such provisions can be safely utilized under the antitrust
laws.
CONCLUSION
MFN clauses can result in lower or higher health care costs,
depending on the conditions in any particular market. Pursuant
43. Id. at 62,371, 62,374-75.
44. Id. at 62,375.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Compare supra notes 20-32, and accompanying text.
47. The federal district court noted that if the MFN clause at issue in Ocean State
was held not to violate the federal antitrust laws, certainly the watered-down version
at issue in National Benefit, "which entitles [Blue Cross] only to notice and an oppor-
tunity to renegotiate," did not violate these laws. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,831,
at 62,375.
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to an MFN clause, providers may end up lowering the prices
they charge to any insurer who negotiates an MFN clause to
equal the lowest price providers charge other insurers, or prov-
iders may raise the prices charged insurers to meet the cost
charged to the insurer with the clause. The only certainty is that
the charges will be the same, not necessarily lower.
However, doubt has been expressed about the benefits con-
sumers will ever see. More troubling, competing insurers may
be squeezed out of the marketplace in the short term, leading to
less competition and higher costs in the long run.
It remains to be seen whether these clauses will continue to
pass antitrust scrutiny given the anticompetitive effects indicated
by the current administration.
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